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PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
UNDER THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION
Darya V. Swingle
Abstract: Personal liability for sexual harassment stands at the forefront of employment
law and the American political conscience. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the
Washington Law Against Discrimination both enjoin employers from engaging in sexual
harassment. The federal circuit courts have uniformly held that individual employees are
exempt from personal liability for sexual harassment under Title VII because they do not fit
the statutory definition of "employer." Washington courts have yet to address the issue under
state law. This Comment argues that the correct interpretation of the Washington Law Against
Discrimination bars individuals from personal liability for sexual harassment. Interpretations
of analogous federal and state statutes coupled with Washington case law and statutory
structure compel the conclusion that only employing entities, not individuals, may be liable
for sexual harassment under the Washington Law Against Discrimination.
Thanks in large part to Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, President
Clinton, and Paula Jones, sexual harassment has received more
mainstream press in the past decade than any other issue in employment
law. What many, indeed most, people probably do not realize, however,
is that neither Clarence Thomas nor Bill Clinton, nor any other individual
sued under federal law, can be personally liable for sexual harassment,
regardless of whether they engaged in harassing conduct. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, which governs sexual harassment under federal law,
imposes liability for harassment only on employers.' For thirty years
federal courts disagreed over whether an individual could fit the Title VII
definition of "employer" and thus be personally liable for harassment.2
Within the past five years, the federal circuit courts have come to the
consensus that an individual may not be personally liable for harassment
under Title VIIV In the federal system, the story ends there.
Personal liability under state law remains unclear. A few states, such
as California, have statutory provisions specifically providing that
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
2. See Phillip L. Lamberson, Comment, Personal Liabili yfor Violations of Title VII: Thirty Years
of Indecision, 46 Baylor L. Rev. 419 (1994) (noting history of disagreement among courts over
personal liability under Title VII and arguing that correct interpretation of Title VII allows for
personal liability).
3. See infra note 16.
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individuals may be liable for harassment.4 But, the language in most state
anti-discrimination statutes is not so clear or specific. Under Washington
law, an "employer" may be liable for sexual harassment.5 No court,
however, has resolved whether an individual can qualify as an employer
and thus be personally liable for sexual harassment. This Comment
argues that individuals should not be held personally liable as employers
under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), the law
prohibiting sexual harassment in Washington.6 Part I examines the
federal circuit courts' reasoning for concluding that Title VII does not
permit personal liability. Federal case law informs the interpretation of
the WLAD because the WLAD substantially parallels Title VII and the
Washington courts have not conclusively addressed personal liability
under the WLAD.7 Part II traces the legislative history and case law
interpreting the WLAD. Part III argues that individuals should not be
liable as employers under the current WLAD.
I. PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Although Washington state courts have yet to address personal
liability under the WLAD, they have held repeatedly that the WLAD
4. Under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, it is an unlawful employment practice
"[flor an employer.., or any other person, because of... sex, to harass an employee or applicant."
Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h)(1) (West 1998). The West Virginia Human Rights Act makes it
unlawful for "any person... [to e]ngage in any form of threats or reprisal, or to engage in, or hire,
or conspire with others to commit acts or activities of any nature, the purpose of which is to harass,
degrade, embarrass or cause physical harm or economic loss." W. Va. Code § 5-1 1-9(7)(A) (1998).
5. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1998).
6. This Comment does not reach the issue of personal liability for harassment under the aiding
and abetting provision of the WLAD. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.220 (1998). Courts have
interpreted numerous other states' anti-discrimination statutes to impose personal liability for aiding
and abetting discrimination or sexual harassment. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317
(2d Cir. 1995) (New York Human Rights Law); Wasserman v. Potamkin Toyota, Inc., No. CIV.A.
98-0792, 1998 WL 744090, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 1998) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Act);
Tyson v. CIGNA Corp., 918 F. Supp. 836, 837 (D.N.J. 1996) (New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination); Schram v. Albertson's, Inc., 934 P.2d 483, 487 (Or. 1997) (Oregon Revised
Statutes § 659.030).
7. In Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide, the Washington Court of Appeals held that under the
WLAD, individuals could be personally liable as employers for sexual harassment. No. 38023-1-I,
1998 WL 34645, at *3-5 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1998). The court later withdrew its opinion from
publication in order to reconsider the case. 950 P.2d 953 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). A new opinion is
pending. In a later case, the Washington State Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue of
individual liability under the WLAD, stating that the plaintiff's claim against the individuals was
indistinguishable from her claim against her employer. Hatch v. Fred Meyer, Inc., No. 42304-5-I,
1999 WL 106923, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1999).
Personal Liability for Sexual Harassment
substantially parallels Title VII.8 Thus, federal interpretations of Title VII
are persuasive when examining the WLAD. 9 In addition, the sex
discrimination chapter of the Washington Administrative Code
specifically states:
In the interest of consistency and to avoid confusion on the part of
persons governed by both the state and federal sex discrimination
laws, the [Washington Human Rights C]ommission will generally
follow the interpretations of the sex discrimination provisions of
Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC
§ 2000e and following, where the federal act is comparable to the
state act.' °
The federal courts have examined extensively personal liability for
sexual harassment under Title VII and have come to the consensus that
there is no personal liability."
Title VII prohibits sexual harassment by forbidding an employer to
"fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's.., sex."' 2 For purposes of Title VII, "employer" is defined
as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent
of such a person."' 3 Initially, federal courts disagreed over whether
individuals could fit within this definition of "employer" and thus be
held personally liable for violations of Title VII.'4 Although the U.S.
8. Kahn v. Salerno, 90 Wash. App. 110, 118 n.2, 951 P.2d 321, 326 n.2 (1998); Anaya v. Graham,
89 Wash. App. 588, 592, 950 P.2d 16, 18-19 (1998); Payne v. Children's Home Soc'y of Wash.,
Inc., 77 Wash. App. 507, 512, 892 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1995); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 76
Wash. App. 853, 857, 888 P.2d 753, 756 (1995); Graves v. Department of Game, 76 Wash. App.
705, 712, 887 P.2d 424, 428 (1994). It should be noted, however, that unlike the WLAD, Title VII
does not contain an aiding and abetting provision. Although the original WLAD predates Title VII,
the Washington Legislature enacted the WLAD provision adding sex as a protected class seven years
after Title VII. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 81, § 3(3), 1971 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
549,551.
9. Supra note 8.
10. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-30-010 (1997).
11. See infra note 16.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
14. See supra note 2. For scholarly commentary assessing the arguments for and against personal
liability under Title VIt, see generally Rick A. Howard, Debating Individual Liability Under Title
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Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, 5 the federal circuits now
agree that individuals do not fit the Title VII definition of "employer"
and therefore cannot be personally liable for sexual harassment under
Title VII.16
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 677 (1996) (canvassing arguments for and against personal
liability); Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimination,
30 Ga. L. Rev. 509 (1996) (analyzing arguments for and against personal liability and concluding
that Congress did not intend personal liability); Ming K. Ayvas, Note, The Circuit Split on Title VII
Personal Supervisor Liability, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 797 (1996) (arguing for personal liability);
Gregory M.P. Davis, Comment, More Than a Supervisor Bargains For: Individual Liability Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and Other Employment Discrimination Statutes, 1997 Wis. L.
Rev. 321 (1997) (canvassing arguments for and against personal liability and concluding that
Congress never intended personal liability); Cristopher Greer, Note, "Who, Me?": A Supervisor's
Individual Liability for Discrimination in the Workplace, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1835 (1994) (arguing
for personal liability); Kathryn L. Hensiak, Comment, When the Boss Steps Over the Line:
Supervisor Liability Under Title VII, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 645 (1997) (arguing for personal liability);
Clara J. Montanari, Comment, Supervisor Liability Under Title VII: A "Feel Good" Judicial
Decision, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 351 (1996) (arguing against personal liability); Kendra Samson, Note,
Does Title VII Allow for Liability Against Individual Defendants?, 84 Ky. L.J. 1303 (1995-96)
(arguing for personal liability).
15. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari where personal liability was directly
at issue. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.
Miller v. La Rosa, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1015 (1994); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1058 (1994). In Miller, the question presented was: "Can [an] agent of [an]
employer be held personally liable for his or her discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII or
[the] ADEA?" Miller v. La Rosa, 62 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1993) (No. 93-659). The
questions presented in Grant included: "In [a] Title VII gender discrimination suit based upon sexual
harassment, is judgment for back pay against [an] individual employee/agent of [a] corporate
employer consistent with [the] intent of Congress?" and, "Should this court resolve [the] conflict in
decisions by courts of appeals on [the] question of whether [an] individual employee/agent can be
held responsible for back pay as [a] remedy in [a] Title VII case?" 63 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 11,
1994) (No. 94-365). The questions presented in Birkbeck included: "When [a] jury finds that [a]
high-level corporate officer (and shareholder) intentionally discriminated against older workers by
firing them because of their age, may that officer be held individually liable for damages under
ADEA?" 63 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1994) (No. 94-719). The Supreme Court has ruled,
however, that Title VII does not allow an employer against whom damages have been assessed to
seek contribution from the individual employee responsible for the harassment. Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 94-95 (1981). Because liability on the same
claim or injury is fundamental to a right of contribution, the Court's refusal to allow contribution
against an individual under Title VII could imply that the Court agrees that an individual cannot be
liable under Title VII.
16. The cases that circuit courts of appeals have decided dealing with this issue are, in numerical
order, as follows: Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995); Kachmar v. Sungard Data
Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1997); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061
(3d Cir. 1996); Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998); Birkbeck, 30 F.3d
507; Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999); Grant, 21 F.3d 649; Wathen
v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490
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Several arguments recur in the federal circuit court decisions finding
no personal liability under Title VII. In Miller v. Maxwell's International
Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that it would be incongruous to hold
individuals liable for sexual harassment when employers with fewer than
fifteen employees are not liable. 7 The court reasoned that Congress
exempted small businesses because it did not want to impose on them the
burden of the costs of litigation. 8 The court further declared it
"inconceivable" that Congress intended to exempt small entities from
this burden while at the same time imposing it upon individuals. 9 This
small business exemption argument has been cited heavily by other
circuit courts.2"
In Miller, the Ninth Circuit also held that the "any agent" language in
the Title VII definition of "employer" is simply an expression of
respondeat superior liability,2' not an inclusion of liability for the agent
personally.' The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits
have all utilized this argument.' Using a different rationale, the Eleventh
Circuit has also declared that the relief granted under Title VII is against
the employer, not against an individual.24
(7th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995); Spencer v. Ripley County State
Bank, 123 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1997); Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch.
Dist, 121 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 1997); Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185 (9th
Cir. 1998); Miller, 991 F.2d 583; Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1996); Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490 (1 lth Cir. 1995); Gary
v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Only the First Circuit has yet to join its sister circuits in
finding no liability for individuals under Title VII. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 992 (lst
Cir. 1997) (explicitly declining to address personal liability under Title VII).
17. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Indest, 164 F.3d at 262; Lissau, 159 F.3d at 180; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Sheridan, 100 F.3d
at 1077-78; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Grant, 21 F.3d at 652.
21. The doctrine of respondeat superior states that principals are liable for the wrongful acts of
their agents. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at 499 (5th ed.
1984).
22. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
23. Lissau, 159 F.3d at 180; Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir.
1998); Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405-06; Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Grant, 21
F.3d at 652.
24. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (1 lth Cir. 1991). Although Busby is a racial
harassment case, the court's interpretation of Title VII applies to the sexual harassment context as
evidenced by the circuit courts that have relied upon the Busby rationale in sexual harassment cases.
See, e.g., Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504
(11th Cir. 1995); Grant, 21 F.3d at 652; see also infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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Courts have further concluded that the absence of any reference to
personal liability both in the legislative process leading to the enactment
of Title VII and in the text of the statute itself illustrate that Title VII
does not impose personal liability.25 The Second and Sixth Circuits have
reasoned that the lack of any discussion of personal liability in the floor
debates over Title VII shows that such liability was never intended.26 In
addition, courts have noted the absence of explicit language in Title VII
proscribing conduct by individuals, contrasted with the use of such
language in other statutes,27 as evidence that Congress knows how to
impose personal liability when it wishes, but that it chose not to do so
when enacting or amending Title VII.2 1
Many federal circuit courts have cited aspects of the remedial scheme
of Title VII as proof that individuals may not be personally liable.29 First,
courts have noted that when Congress adopted the Title VII definition of
"employer," the only remedies the Act provided were reinstatement and
back pay-remedies traditionally available only from an employing
entity, not an individual. 0 Although Congress added compensatory and
punitive damages through the 1991 Civil Rights Act, these damages are
mandatorily calibrated and capped based on how many employees work
for the defendant employer.3 Courts have inferred from this damages
scheme that despite the personal nature of the added damages, Congress
intended for these damages to be imposed only on employers, not
individuals. 2 Second, numerous courts have also reasoned that the
absence of any language in the 1991 amendment addressing personal
liability or the damages assessable against an individual further illustrates
that Congress did not intend to add personal liability when it amended
25. See Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Grant, 21 F.3d at 653.
26. Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) ("All persons"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. II 1997) ("Every person");
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994) ("Two or more persons"); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1994) ("Every person").
28. Grant, 21 F.3d at 653.
29. See, e.g., Lissau, 159 F.3d at 181; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314-16.
30. Lissau, 159 F.3d at 180-81; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (citing Padway
v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982)); Grant, 21 F.3d at 653.
31. The 1991 damages provision creates a sliding scale ranging from up to $50,000 for an
employer with between 14 and 101 employees, to up to $300,000 for employers with more than 500
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (1994).
32. Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996); Tomka, 66
F.3d at 1315.
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Title VII?. Finally, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
have concluded that Congress would not have added personal liability
through the 1991 remedy provisions of Title VII, while not even
mentioning such liability in the substantive provisions of the law. 4
Despite the unified response of the federal circuit courts, personal
liability under Title VII is still not resolved beyond all doubt. The
Individual Liability for Discrimination Act of 1997, which calls for an
amendment to Title VII clarifying that individuals may be personally
liable for discrimination, went before the U.S. Congress on June 26,
1997."5 Although there has been no action on the bill since it was
introduced and sent to the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce,36 its mere existence shows that the controversy surrounding
personal liability continues.
In addition, several arguments for personal liability occasionally
resurface in federal district court opinions criticizing the circuit courts
and imposing personal liability. 7 The most common argument for
personal liability is that the plain meaning of the Title VII definition of
33. Lissau, 159 F.3d at 181; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,
100 F.3d 1061, 1077 (3d Cir. 1996); Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; Miller v.
Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583,588 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).
34. Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; Miller, 991 F.2d at
588 n.2.
35. H.R. 2078, 105th Cong. (1997). The bill reads in part:
Congress has always intended that individuals who discriminate in employment within the
meaning of [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be held individually liable for their
actions, whether or not any other entity or individual is also liable. Courts have in general
faithfully carried out this mandate. Recently, in sexual harassment cases in particular, some
courts have failed to hold individuals liable for their discriminatory conduct that is otherwise
clearly covered by [Tlitle VII, on grounds that individuals cannot be held liable under it. This
Act will prevent this misreading.... Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-5) is amended by adding at the end the following: "(1) Individuals are individually liable
for acts of discrimination committed by them in employment, when the acts are otherwise
covered by this title, whether or not any other party is also liable for their acts."
H.R. 2078, §§ 2-3.
36. 143 Cong. Rec. H4834 (daily ed. June 26, 1997).
37. Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D.RLI. 1998) (holding that individuals
may be liable under Title VII and Rhode Island state law); Speight v. Albano Cleaners, Inc., 21
F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that individual may be liable as employer under Title VII
if he has significant control over plaintiff and harassment is not plainly delegable decision); Ostrach
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 957 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (criticizing Miller but following
holding because bound by it); lacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding that
individuals may be liable under Title VII based on analysis in Tomka dissent); see also supra note 14
(listing scholarly commentators arguing for personal liability).
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"employer" imposes liability upon agents individually.5 A few courts
have held that limiting the "agent" language to an incorporation of
respondeat superior renders the phrase superfluous, thus violating the
canon of statutory construction that every phrase must be given
meaning.39 Another recurring argument is that the 1991 addition of
damages of the type traditionally available against an individual
illustrates the congressional intent to permit personal liability.40 Some
courts have championed personal liability as necessary to deter future
misconduct4 and appropriate because it places blame on the party at
fault.42 Other courts have held that individuals who have sufficient
employer-like authority, such as the power to hire or fire employees,
should be treated as employers. 43 Finally, some have argued that in order
to accomplish the broad remedial purpose of Title VII, courts should
interpret the statute liberally to include personal liability." Although
these arguments favoring personal liability have some merit, all but one
federal circuit court agree that the correct interpretation of Title VII bars
individuals from personal liability as employers.45
II. THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
A. The WLAD and the Definition of "Employer"
In 1949, the Washington Legislature adopted the Washington Law
Against Discrimination (WLAD) to prevent and eliminate discrimination
in employment in Washington.46 As enacted, the WLAD declared that it
38. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319-20 (Parker, J., dissenting); Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 205-07; Ostrach,
957 F. Supp. at 198; Howard, supra note 14, at 678.
39. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319 (Parker, J., dissenting); Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 208; Ostrach, 957
F. Supp. at 199; Howard, supra note 14, at 679; see also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 46.06, at 104 (4th ed. 1984).
40. Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 209; Ostrach, 957 F. Supp. at 199.
41. Ostrach, 957 F. Supp. at 199; Howard, supra note 14, at 679.
42. Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 208; White, supra note 14, at 548-49.
43. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit in Tomka
responded to this argument by explaining that this interpretation would force courts to draw a
distinction between supervisors with hire/fire power and those without it, a distinction with no basis
in the language of Title VII. 66 F.3d at 1314-15.
44. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1320 (Parker, J., dissenting); Howard, supra note 14, at 678-79.
45. See supra note 16.
46. The current WLAD also bars discrimination against members of the protected classes in credit
and insurance transactions, in places of public resort, amusement, or accommodation, and in real
property transactions. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.60.176, .178, .215, .222, & .223 (1998).
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was an unfair employment practice for an employer to "discriminate
against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of
employment because of such person's race, creed, color or national
origin."' In 1971, the legislature added sex as a protected class.48
Under the original WLAD, complaints alleging violation of the law
were handled by the Washington Human Rights Commission (WHRC),
the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the law.49 The
remedies available were limited to "conference, conciliation and
persuasion,"5 an order from the Commission requiring the respondent to
cease and desist from the unfair employment practice,5 a restraining
order from the court, or other appropriate temporary relief.2 The 1973
amendment to the law created a civil cause of action for anyone injured
by a violation of the law and added the remedies of actual damages,
attorneys' fees, and any other remedy authorized by the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964.53
47. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 183, § 7(1)(c), 1949 Wash. Laws 506, 512.
48. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 81, § 3(3), 1971 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 549, 551. The
law also declares that the opportunity to obtain and hold employment free from discrimination is a
civil right. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1) (1998). However, the fallout of this provision has rarely
been examined by the courts. But see Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash. 2d 58, 922 P.2d 788 (1996)
(Talmadge, J., dissenting) (arguing that civil right to be free from discrimination creates cause of
action distinct from unfair employment practices provision); Jonathan A. Moskowitz, Comment,
Permitting Employers to Violate Employees' Civil Rights: The Griffin v. Eller Exemption from
Washington's Law Against Discrimination, 7 J.L. & Pol'y 121 (1998) (discussing implications of
WLAD civil right to be free from discrimination). Even though freedom from discrimination is a
civil right, there is generally no common law cause of action for sexual harassment per se. Barbara
Lindemann & David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 128 (Supp. 1997). But see
Roberts v. Dudley, 92 Wash. App. 652, 966 P.2d 377 (1998) (creating common law cause of action
for gender discrimination). Yet, neither the Supreme Court of Washington nor the Washington Court
of Appeals has agreed with or validated Roberts.
49. Ch. 183, § 8, 1949 Wash. Laws 506, 513-14.
50. § 8, 1949 Wash. Laws at 513-14. This phrase generally describes the procedure undertaken
by the Washington Human Rights Commission (WHRC) to eliminate an unfair practice as set out in
a complaint. The procedure includes meeting with the respondent to discuss the situation and explain
the law. If unable to eliminate the unfair practice, the WHRC appoints a hearing tribunal with the
power to make findings of fact and issue and serve a cease and desist order. If the cease and desist
order is disobeyed, the WHRC may seek enforcement through an order of the court or by criminal
proceedings if necessary. Frank P. Helsell, The Law Against Discrimination in Employment, 25
Wash. L. Rev. 225,226-28 (1950).
51. § 8, 1949 Wash. Laws at 513-14.
52. § 9, 1949 Wash. Laws at 515.
53. Ch. 141, § 3(2), 1973 Wash. Laws 418, 420. Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the remedies
available under Title VII were limited to back pay and reinstatement. See supra note 30.
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The WLAD bars employers from engaging in unfair employment
practices;54 thus, to impose liability, courts must first find that the
defendant fits the statutory definition of "employer."55 The WLAD
defines "employer" as "any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not
include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private
profit."56 The WLAD's legislative history contains no discussion of the
meaning of "employer" at the time the law was enacted or at any later
date, and the original bill was adopted word for word as it was
proposed. 7 Although the legislature has amended or modified other
provisions of the WLAD numerous times, the definition of "employer"
has remained essentially the same since 1949.58
An employer may avoid WLAD liability by invoking either of the two
statutory exemptions in the definition of "employer": having fewer than
eight employees, or being a "religious or sectarian organization not
organized for profit."5 9 In Griffin v. Eller, the Supreme Court of
Washington reaffirmed the validity of these exemptions and held that a
sole practitioner with fewer than eight employees was statutorily exempt
from sexual harassment liability under the WLAD.' In arriving at its
holding, the court first noted the absence of any legislative history
indicating that the 1973 addition of the statutory private remedy was
54. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1998).
55. Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash. 2d 58, 64, 922 P.2d 788, 790 (1996); Farnam v. CRISTA
Ministries, 116 Wash. 2d 659, 673, 807 P.2d 830, 837 (1991); Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912,
915, 784 P.2d 1258, 1259 (1990).
56. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(3) (1998). The WLAD defines "person" to include "one or
more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, cooperatives, legal
representatives, trustees and receivers, or any group of persons; it includes any owner, lessee,
proprietor, manager, agent, employee, whether one or more natural persons." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 49.60.040(1) (1998).
57. Compare S. 12, 31st Cong. (Wash. 1949), with Law Against Discrimination, ch. 183, 1949
Wash. Laws 506.
58. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(3); § 3(b), 1949 Wash. Laws at 507. Although the
definition has never been amended, bills to change it have been proposed but have not passed. See,
e.g., S. 5130, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999) (proposing that WLAD definition of
"employer" be amended to include employers with one or more employees).
59. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(3).
60. Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d 58, 922 P.2d 788. Justice Talmadge, however, vigorously dissented,
arguing that the eight-employee threshold applies only to unfair practices and the jurisdiction of the
WHRC, not to the civil right to be free of discrimination enforced by a private action in court as set
out in RCW 49.60.030. Id. at 72-97, 922 P.2d at 794-806 (Talmadge, J., dissenting); see also
Moskowitz, supra note 48 (criticizing court's holding in Griffin and arguing that eight-employee
threshold applies only to jurisdiction of WHRC).
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intended to allow a statutory cause of action against small, otherwise
exempt employers." The court then cited Bennett v. Hardy, where the
Supreme Court of Washington noted in dicta that small employers are
per se exempt from statutory liability." To further bolster its statutory
exemption holding, the court discussed Farnam v. CRISTA Ministries, in
which it previously had used the WLAD exception for religious
organizations to excuse CRISTA Ministries from liability.63 The Griffin
holding that a sole practitioner cannot be liable for sexual harassment
illustrates that individual employees should not be liable as employers
under the WLAD.
In Anaya v. Graham, the Washington Court of Appeals clarified
another aspect of the WLAD definition of "employer" by adopting the
payroll method as the proper method for counting employees for
purposes of the eight-employee threshold.' Under this method, an
employee may be counted for purposes of the eight-employee threshold
if the individual's name is on the employer's payroll for the period
covering the dates on which the alleged harassment occurred.6' Anaya
implies that to be an employer, one must maintain a payroll, an activity
traditionally reserved for employing entities, not individuals.
Although Washington courts have examined and applied the WLAD
small business exemption, the legislative history of the WLAD provides
no insight as to the reasons behind this exemption." The only guidance
available comes from WHRC regulations promulgated in 1982, thirty-
three years after the legislature created the exemption.67 The regulations
state that the reasons for the exemption are "[t]o relieve small businesses
61. Id at 63, 922 P.2d at 790.
62. Id. at 64, 922 P.2d at 790 (citing Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 915, 784 P.2d 1258,
1259 (1990)).
63. Id. (citing Famnam v. CRISTA Ministries, 116 Wash. 2d 659, 673, 678, 807 P.2d 830, 837,
840 (1991)).
64. 89 Wash. App. 588, 593, 950 P.2d 16, 19 (1998) (citing Walters v. Metropolitan Educ.
Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997), where Supreme Court embraced this method). The Anaya court
also noted that adopting the payroll method "would serve the objective of making interpretations of
RCW 49.60 consistent with federal antidiscrimination law." Id
65. Id.
66. Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at 928, 784 P.2d at 1265. The Griffin court hypothesized that the
legislature may have included the small business exemption to conserve state resources or to protect
small businesses from the regulatory burden and expense of litigation. Giffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 66-
67, 922 P.2d at 791. For an extensive, although slanted, discussion of the history of the WIAD and
the small business exemption, see id. at 81-87, 922 P.2d at 799-801 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
67. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(2) (1997).
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of a regulatory burden" and "[i]n the interest of cost effectiveness, to
confine public agency enforcement of the law to employers whose
practices affect a substantial number of persons."6 It should be noted,
however, that the stated purpose of these regulations was to establish
standards for determining who may be counted as an employee for
purposes of the eight-employee threshold, not to explain the small
business exemption.69
B. Sexual Harassment Under the WLAD
Washington courts have interpreted the WLAD unfair employment
practices provision as protecting workers from sexual harassment in the
workplace.7" Courts have distinguished two categories of sexual
harassment: hostile work environment harassment and quid pro quo
harassment.7 ' Hostile work environment harassment occurs when
offensive and unwelcome conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
create a work environment that is hostile or abusive.72 In Glasgow v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., the Supreme Court of Washington set out the
four elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of hostile work
environment sexual harassment.73 A plaintiff must prove that (1) the
conduct was unwelcome, (2) the harassment was because of sex, (3) the
harassment affected the terms and conditions of employment, and (4) the
68. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(2).
69. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(1) (1997); Wash. St. Reg. 82-08-070, 82-16-082. The
Anaya opinion was necessary to supplement the WAC regulations and resolve whether an employee
actually had to work on the day in question to qualify as being "employed." Anaya, 89 Wash. App.
at 592, 950 P.2d at 18.
70. See Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401, 693 P.2d 708 (1985); Anaya, 89
Wash. App. 588, 950 P.2d 16; Wilson v. Olivetti N. Am., Inc., 85 Wash. App. 804, 934 P.2d 1231
(1997); Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment, Inc., 79 Wash. App. 808, 905 P.2d 392 (1995).
71. Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 405, 693 P.2d at 711; Schonauer, 79 Wash. App. at 819, 905 P.2d
at 399; Thompson v. Berta Enter., Inc., 72 Wash. App. 531, 536, 864 P.2d 983, 986 (1994). In June
1998, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the legal distinction in Title VII cases between quid pro
quo harassment and hostile work environment harassment and 15 years of federal case law built on
this distinction. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264-65 (1998). However, the
Supreme Court of Washington has not abandoned this distinction or addressed the issue under
Washington law since the Ellerth opinion was issued.
72. Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 406-07, 693 P.2d at 711-12.
73. Id. As a preliminary matter, the plaintiff must identify and prove the alleged offensive
conduct. Schonauer, 79 Wash. App. at 820,905 P.2d at 399.
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harassment can be imputed to the employer.74 To satisfy the fourth
element, a plaintiff must prove that the employer:
(a) authorized, knew, or should have known of the harassment and
(b) failed to take reasonably prompt and adequate corrective action.
This may be shown by proving (a) that complaints were made to
the employer through higher managerial or supervisory personnel
or by proving such pervasiveness of sexual harassment at the
workplace as to create an inference of the employer's knowledge or
constructive knowledge of it and (b) that the employer's remedial
action was not of such nature as to have been reasonably calculated
to end the harassment.7'
The Glasgow court explained:
[T]he essential purpose of the cause of action, which we herein
recognize, [is] to be preventive in nature. As the fourth element of
the cause of action makes clear, an employer may ordinarily avoid
liability by taking prompt and adequate corrective action when it
learns that an employee is being sexually harassed.76
Quid pro quo harassment is the extortion of sexual favors or tolerance
of sexual harassment in exchange for job benefits or protection against
adverse employment actions.77 Necessary to a claim of this type is that
someone who has actual or apparent authority over the victim commit
harassment such that the threat of adverse employment action is
realistic.7" In these types of cases, the fact that a supervisor engaged in
the misconduct is sufficient to impute the harassment to the employer
and the employer is therefore strictly liable.79 In Thompson v. Berta
Enterprises, Inc,, the Washington Court of Appeals explained that
74. Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 406-07, 693 P.2d at 711-12.
75. Id. at 407, 693 P.2d at 712.
76. Id. at 407-08, 693 P.2d at 712-13; see also Herried v. Pierce County Pub. Transp. Benefit
Auth. Corp., 90 Wash. App. 468, 474-75, 957 P.2d 767, 770-71 (1998) (holding that employer's
remedial action is enough to avoid liability).
77. DeWater v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 128, 134, 921 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996); Glasgow, 103
Wash. 2d at 405, 693 P.2d at 711; Schonauer, 79 Wash. App. at 823, 905 P.2d at 401. The plaintiff
must also prove that the conduct was unwelcome and was based on gender. Schonauer, 79
Wash. App. at 823, 905 P.2d at 401.
78. DeWater, 130 Wash. 2d at 135, 921 P.2d at 1062; Thompson v. Berta Enter., Inc., 72
Wash. App. 531, 538-39, 864 P.2d 983, 987 (1994); see also I Barbara Lindemann & Paul
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 759 (3d ed. 1996).
79. DeWater, 130 Wash. 2d at 135,921 P.2d at 1062; Schonauer, 79 Wash. App. at 824,905 P.2d
at 401; Thompson, 72 Wash. App. at 537-38, 864 P.2d at 986-87.
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imposing strict liability on employers for quid pro quo harassment is
sound public policy because it requires employers to be responsible for
ensuring that the people to whom they give authority do not abuse that
authority."0 The court further explained that "[strict liability] places the
burden for preventing quid pro quo sexual harassment on those best
situated to prevent it.""
There is a theoretical distinction between vicarious liability for quid
pro quo harassment and direct liability for negligent failure to remedy
hostile work environment harassment. In either case, however, the
WLAD imposes liability on the employer, not the individual harasser.
III. INDIVIDUALS SHOULD NOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER THE WLAD
The WLAD definition of "employer" should preclude personal
liability for several reasons. First, many of the reasons given by federal
circuit courts to support holdings of no personal liability under Title VII
apply by analogy to the WLAD. 2 Second, the statutory language and
structure of the WLAD compel the conclusion that individuals are not
personally liable for sexual harassment. Third, policy reasons weigh
against imposing personal liability. Finally, the interpretation given to
other state statutes analogous to the WLAD supports barring personal
liability in Washington.
A. Title VII Arguments Prohibiting Liability for Individuals as
Employers Apply by Analogy to the WLAD
The federal courts' interpretation of Title VII as enjoining personal
liability strongly supports the conclusion that personal liability should
not be injected into the WLAD unfair employment practices provision.
The Title VII holdings are compelling because Washington courts
consistently have held that federal court interpretations of Title VII are
persuasive when interpreting the WLAD. 3 Furthermore, the WHRC
80. Thompson, 72 Wash. App. at 537-38, 864 P.2d at 987.
81. Id. at 538, 864 P.2d at 987.
82. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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regulations state that where analogous, Washington law should be
interpreted consistently with federal law."
1. The WLAD Small Business Exemption Precludes Liability for
Individuals as Employers
The inclusion of the small business exemption in the WLAD
definition of "employee' confirms that individuals should not be
statutorily liable as employers. In Miller v. Maxwell's International Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress created the Title VII small
business exemption because it "did not want to burden small entities with
the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims." 5 The court
declared, "If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited
resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to
allow civil liability to run against individual employees." 6 In Griffin v.
Eller, the Supreme Court of Washington hypothesized that the reasons
for the analogous WLAD small business exemption may include
conserving state resources and protecting small businesses from a
regulatory burden and the expense of private litigation. 7 In light of the
similar reasons behind the Title VII and WLAD small business
exemptions given by the Miller and Griffin courts, the Miller holding that
the small business exemption supports no personal liability applies
equally well to the WLAD.
The facts and holding of Griffin also illustrate the incongruity of
personal liability under the WLAD. In Griffin, the Supreme Court of
Washington refused even to reach the merits of Ms. Griffin's hostile
work environment claim because Mr. Eller, a sole practitioner, did not
have eight employees and was therefore statutorily exempt.88 The court's
application of the small business exemption in Griffin highlights the
inconsistency of suggesting that the WLAD imposes personal liability on
84. Statements lauding consistency with federal law appear both in the Washington
Administrative Code section specifically addressing the small business exemption as well as in the
general chapter on sex discrimination. Wash. Admin. Code §§ 162-16-160(3)(c), 162-30-010 (1997).
85. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
86. Ra
87. Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash. 2d 58, 66-67, 922 P.2d 788, 791 (1996). The court also proffered
as reasons for the WLAD small business exemption that "the State has a substantial interest in the
well-being of small business with regard to the state economy, tax base, and opportunities for
employment." Id. at 68, 922 P.2d at 792; see also supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
88. Griffln, 130 Wash. 2d at 64,922 P.2d at 790.
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an individual employee while exempting a sole practitioner through the
small business exemption. To be consistent with Griffin, individuals,
whether or not they own their own businesses, should not be liable as
employers under the WLAD.
Furthermore, the Washington Court of Appeal's adoption of the
payroll method 89 for counting employees in Anaya v. Graham indicates
that the WLAD small business exemption protects individuals from
liability as employers. Because only an employing entity, not an
individual employee, has a payroll and thus can reach the eight-employee
threshold, Anaya supports the conclusion that individuals may not be
personally liable as employers under the WLAD.91
2. WLAD Relieffor Sexual Harassment Is Only Against
an "Employer"
Another argument borrowed from the Title VII analysis originates in
the language of the WLAD imposing liability for sexual harassment on
an "employer." 92 In the federal context, the Eleventh Circuit declared that
"[t]he relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not
individual employees." 93 The court explained that "the proper method for
a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is by suing the employer, either by
naming the supervisory employees as agents of the employer or by
naming the employer directly." 94 These statements apply with equal force
to the relief granted under the WLAD because the WLAD specifically
targets its unfair employment practices provision at employers.9"
89. Under the payroll method, an employee may be counted for purposes of the eight-employee
threshold if the individual's name is on the employer's payroll for the period covering the pertinent
dates. See supra note 64.
90. 89 Wash. App. 588, 950 P.2d 16 (1998).
91. The court's requirement that an employer have a payroll also rebuts the argument that
supervisors who have sufficient employer-like authority may be held liable as employers per se
rather than as employers via the "person acting in the interest" language. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
92. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1998).
93. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11 th Cir. 1991).
94. Id.
95. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180.
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a. U.S. Supreme Court Interpretation of Title VII Verifies that
"Employer's " Conduct Is the Focus of Sexual Harassment Laws
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinions in Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth96 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,97 two recent supervisor
sexual harassment cases, highlight that federal sexual harassment law
focuses on the actions of the employer, not the individual. The Court
used identical language in both cases to hold that where a supervisor has
engaged in harassment, but not taken any tangible employment action,98
an employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages if it
can show "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."" Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly
addressed personal liability,00 the holdings in Faragher and Ellerth
illustrate that the actions of the employer and the avoidance of harm by the
plaintiff are at the heart of Title VII liability, not the actions of WLAD.
The title of the WLAD sexual harassment provision, "Unfair practices
of employers," and its explicit directive at "any employer" illustrate that,
like Title VII, the WLAD focuses on the employer and the employment
relationship.' Individuals are therefore appropriately excluded from
liability because, by definition, it is the employment relationship that
makes the harassment possible.'0 2 A non-employer individual alone has
no ability to violate the statute.0 3 A construction worker who whistles and
makes catcalls at a particular woman on a daily basis has not violated the
WLAD. However, if the woman is a co-worker, the employer may be
liable because it is responsible for bringing the two individuals together
96. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
97. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
98. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellenh, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
99. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct at 2270. When the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action, this affirmative defense is not available to the employer.
Faragher, 118 S. Ct at 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
100. See supra note 15.
101. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1998); see also supra note 46.
102. White, supra note 14, at 558. This argument was made in the context of Title VIl, but applies
with equal force to the WLAD.
103. Id. at557.
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and sustaining the environment in which the harassment is possible."M Of
course, supporters of personal liability may argue that an employer as an
entity is only made up of individuals and thus cannot act apart from the
acts of the individuals. Regardless of this distinction, however, the unfair
employment practices provision of the WLAD is directed at the
employer, not the individuals that make up the employer.
b. Washington Case Law Backs WLAD Liability Only for Employers
Washington case law also supports the conclusion that WLAD
liability for sexual harassment attaches only to employers, not
individuals. Beginning with Glasgow, Washington courts have
interpreted the WLAD to require that sexually harassing conduct be
imputed to the employer in order for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case of sexual harassment.'0 5 In other words, without a link between the
conduct and the employer, there can be no valid WLAD sexual
harassment claim. Liability can attach to an employer either vicariously
or directly. 06 For quid pro quo harassment, the WLAD automatically
attributes the conduct of the supervisor to the employer, making the
employer strictly liable.'0 7 In hostile work environment cases, liability is
premised upon the employer's failure to react in the appropriate manner
and is therefore direct.' To interpret the WLAD as providing for
personal liability would essentially overrule fifteen years of case law
built upon the Glasgow requirement that the conduct be imputed to the
employer as an element of the prima facie case.'09 Because Washington
courts have held consistently that conduct lacking a connection to an
employer simply does not constitute sexual harassment under the
104. Id. at 558; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
105. Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401, 407, 693 P.2d 708, 712 (1985);
Herried v. Pierce County Pub. Transp. Benefit Auth. Corp., 90 Wash. App. 468, 473, 957 P.2d 767,
769 (1998); Kahn v. Salerno, 90 Wash. App. 110, 118-19, 951 P.2d 321, 326 (1998); Wilson v.
Olivetti N. Am., Inc., 85 Wash. App. 804, 812, 934 P.2d 1231, 1236 (1997); Schonauer v. DCR
Entertainment, Inc., 79 Wash. App. 808, 821, 824,905 P.2d 392,400-01 (1995).
106. See infra notes 107-08.
107. DeWater v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 128, 135, 921 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996); Schonauer, 79
Wash. App. at 824, 905 P.2d at 401.
108. DeWater, 130 Wash. 2d at 135, 921 P.2d at 1063; Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 407, 693 P.2d
at 712; Herried, 90 Wash. App. at 474-75, 957 P.2d at 770-71; Kahn, 90 Wash. App. at 127, 950
P.2d at 331.
109. See supra note 105.
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WLAD, there is no reason to discard this element of the prima facie case
and hold individuals liable for sexual harassment.
3. WLAD "Any Person Acting in the Interest" Language Is an
Expression ofRespondeat Superior Liability
The common refrain in the Title VII cases that the "any agent"
language in the definition of "employer" is merely an expression of
respondeat superior and not an imposition of personal liability applies by
analogy to the WLAD."' Although the WLAD definition of "employer"
uses the phrase "person acting in the interest of," instead of "any agent,"
the definitions are functionally equivalent.' When the legislature
enacted the WLAD, the Restatement of Agency described an agent's
duty of loyalty as "a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of
the principal in all matters connected with his agency." '112 In the
comments to this section, the definition of "agent" is paraphrased as "one
who acts on behalf of the principal."..3 Acting "on behalf of" and "in the
interest of' are essentially the same thing; thus, the federal circuit courts'
holdings regarding the effect of the "agent" language in Title VII apply
with equal force to the WLAD. When comparing the "agent" language in
Title VII to Missouri state law that uses "acting in the interest" language,
the Eighth Circuit explained that the difference in language is "a
distinction without a difference."'"4 Thus, federal court decisions
interpreting Title VII suggest that the WLAD "person acting in the
interest of' language incorporates respondeat superior liability, but does
not impose personal liability.
B. WLAD Statutory Language and Structure Bar Liability for
Individuals as Employers
Relief for sexual harassment may be sought only from an employer
because the statutory structure of the WLAD and its distinct provisions
are targeted at specific entities and specific conduct. While the WLAD
prohibits employers from discriminating in the terms or conditions of
110. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
111. See infra Part MIl.D.1.
112. Restatement ofAgency § 387 (1933).
113. Restatement ofAgency § 387 cmt. a.
114. Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of
the court's reasoning, see infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
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employment," 5 it bars employment agencies from failing or refusing to
classify properly, refer for employment, or otherwise discriminate against
individuals in a protected class." 6 In addition, the WLAD enjoins labor
unions or organizations from discriminating with respect to membership
rights or privileges,"' and forbids persons from discriminating in real
estate'1 or credit transactions.1 9 This precise language defining which
entities are prohibited from which activities confirms that by using the
term "employer," the legislature intended to impose liability for sexual
harassment only on employers, not persons or individuals.
1. Explicit Language Imposing Personal Liability in Other WLAD
Provisions Confirms No Individual Liability for Sexual Harassment
The Washington Legislature knew what language was necessary to
impose personal liability through the WLAD, but chose not to use this
language when proscribing the unlawful employment practices that
include sexual harassment.120 The WLAD declares that it is an unfair
employment practice for an employer to discriminate based on an
individual's sex. In contrast, a subsequent section states that "[i]t is an
unfair practice for any person to aid, abet, encourage, or incite" a
violation of the chapter.'2' In addition, other provisions of the WLAD bar
any person from discriminating against a member of a protected class in
real estate 22 or credit transactions. 23  Notably, these provisions
specifically impose liability on "persons" rather than "employers." If the
legislature had intended to impose personal liability for sexual
harassment on individuals, it would have used the word "person" in
setting out the unfair practices that include sexual harassment.
115. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1998).
116. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.200 (1998).
117. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.190 (1998).
118. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.222 (1998).
119. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.176 (1998).
120. The Fifth Circuit made this argument about personal liability under Title VII. See Grant v.
Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994).
121. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.220 (1998).
122. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.222.
123. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.176.
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2. Legislative History Shows that Congress Never Intended
Personal Liability
The absence of any mention of personal liability in the legislative
history of the WLAD or the regulations promulgated by the WHRC
indicates that the legislature never contemplated personal liability. If the
legislature intended to impose personal liability, it had the burden to
make that clear either on the face of the statute or somewhere in the
legislative history. 24 As the Supreme Court of Washington stated in
Bennett v. Hardy, "[a] court may not read into a statute those things
which it conceives the Legislature may have left out unintentionally."'
The lack of even a single reference to personal liability in the legislative
history or WHRC regulations demonstrates that the framers of the
WLAD never intended to create personal liability for individuals as
employers.
C. Policy Reasons Support Relief Only Against an Employer
Courts should not feel compelled to inject personal liability into the
WLAD because other legal means allow redress against individual
harassers personally. Although sexual harassment is a statutorily created
cause of action, harassment victims may still sue their harassers under
common law theories such as outrage,'26 intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress, 27 battery,' or tortious interference with a business
contract.'29
124. Montanari, supra note 14, at 366 ("It is the job of Congress to clearly enunciate the
principles it codifies.").
125. Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 926, 784 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1990) (quoting Addleman
v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash. 2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1986)).
126. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 491 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Griffin v.
Eller, 130 Wash. 2d 58, 62, 922 P.2d 788, 789 (1996); Anaya v. Graham, 89 Wash. App. 588,
595-96, 950 P.2d 16, 20 (1998); Brown v. Galang, No. 15320-7-I, 1997 WL 530698, at *1 (Wash.
Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1997); Welsch v. Camelot Soc'y Inc., No. 37139-8-1, 1997 WL 79479, at *6-7
(Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1997); Mithoug v. Apollo Radio, No. 12957-8-111, 1997 WL 60897, at *6
(Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1997); Schonauer, 79 Wash. App. 808, 828, 905 P.2d 392,403-04 (1995).
127. Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 491; Griffn, 130 Wash. 2d at 62, 922 P.2d at 789; Subido v. Dills,
No. 40367-2-I, 1999 WL 30365, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1999); Kahn v. Salerno, 90
Wash. App. 110, 116, 951 P.2d 321, 325 (1998); Minger v. Reinhard Distrib. Co., 87 Wash. App.
941, 944,943 P.2d 400,401 (1997); Welsch, 1997 WL 79478, at *7.
128. Austin v. Moon, No. 21612-4-I, 1998 WL 726490, at *1 (Wash. Ct App. Oct. 16, 1998).
129. Mithoug, 1997 WL 60897, at *6. For discussion of common law tort avenues of redress for
sexual harassment, see generally Lindemann & Kadue, supra note 48, at 351-70 (1992) and 128-50
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By limiting liability to an employer, the WLAD encourages
harassment victims to report the alleged offensive conduct to the
employer early in the course of the harassment. If the employee reports
the harassment and the employer takes steps reasonably calculated to end
the harassment, the harassment theoretically stops and the employer will
not be liable. 30 If the employer fails to take measures reasonably
calculated to stop the harassment after the employee reports it, the
employer will be directly liable for failing to act.'3 ' Because employers
cannot regulate every inch of a workplace, encouraging early reporting
provides employers an opportunity to stop harassment before it becomes
unbearable, an essential goal of all anti-discrimination laws.'32 If
individuals could be liable for harassment, there would be less incentive
for employees to report harassment to their employers in the early stages.
Thus, employers would have fewer chances to remedy this unreported
harassment in the workplace as opposed to the courtroom.
Because employers, not individual employees, are responsible for the
creation and maintenance of the workplaces that the WLAD seeks to
regulate, employers are in the best position to monitor and remedy
discrimination by sanctioning offending employees and deterring future
misconduct. Only employers have the ability to provide company-wide
training and education about sexual harassment and the WLAD in
particular. If individuals are held liable, they will certainly have an
incentive to learn about the law and possibly inform friends and family.
However, individuals have no incentive to engage in widespread
education about sexual harassment and the WLAD. Focusing liability
exclusively on employers best furthers the goals of the WLAD by giving
employers strong incentive to take measures to keep the entire workplace
free from discrimination.'33 Although employers cannot recover money
(Supp. 1997). Unlike successful suits under the WLAD, however, these common law theories do not
provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(2) (1998).
130. Heried v. Pierce County Pub. Transp. Benefit Auth. Corp., 90 Wash. App. 468, 475, 957
P.2d 767, 771 (1998).
131. Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 401,407, 693 P.2d 708, 712 (1985).
132. "To the extent limiting employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing
conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VIi's deterrent purpose."
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
133. In Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., the Ninth Circuit suggested that part of the reason for the
U.S. Supreme Court's creation of an affirmative defense for employers in Title VII litigation is
to encourage them to adopt anti-harassment policies. No. 97-17370, 1999 WL 160796, at *4 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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from wayward employees, 1"4 employers are in the best position to absorb
the costs of litigation and also have the means to discipline and punish
employees who cause them to be liable for WLAD damages awards.
The WLAD provision mandating liberal construction of the law'35
does not require that liability be extended to encompass individuals. "[A]
legislative mandate to apply a liberal interpretation to an act will not
justify the judicial creation of rights or liabilities under the guise of
'construction."" 36 The WLAD specifically aims its prohibition against
sexual harassment at employers, not individuals.'37 As the Seventh
Circuit stated in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
We do not doubt that the employment discrimination statutes have
broad remedial purposes and should be interpreted liberally, but
that cannot trump the narrow, focused conclusion we draw from the
structure and logic of the statutes. A liberal construction does not
mean one that flies in the face of the structure of the statute.' 8
Even if protected by. the canopy of the liberal construction clause, to
impose personal liability under the WLAD would be to impermissibly
read into the law something that is simply not there.
D. Analogous Statutes from Other States Support Interpreting the
WLAD to Bar Personal Liability
The interpretation given similar anti-discrimination statutes in other
states constitutes additional evidence that the correct interpretation of the
WLAD shields individuals from liability as employers. 39 The reasoning
134. In order to seek contribution under Washington law, joint tortfeasors must be liable on the
same claim and injury. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.22.030, .040 (1998). However, this is not possible in
the WLAD context because individuals cannot be personally liable for sexual harassment.
135. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (1998).
136. 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 58.05, at 86 (5th ed. 1992) (citing
Rines v. Scott, 432 A.2d 767 (Me. 1981)).
137. See supra Part I.A.2.
138. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
139. But see Genaro v. Central Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1989) (holding that definition
of "employer" under Ohio law contemplates personal liability); Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp.,
24 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding that Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act
imposes personal liability); Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co., 989 F. Supp. 54 (D. Mass. 1997)
(holding individual may be liable for aiding and abetting or for conduct amounting to sexual
harassment); Murphy v. Burgess & Norwalk Econ. Opportunity Now, Inc., No. 3:96CV0 1987, 1997
WL 529610, at *1 (D. Conn. July 16, 1997) (holding Connecticut law different enough from Title
VII that personal liability under state law was not inconsistent); St. Peter v. Ampak-Division of
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used in interpreting these statutes is compelling because the WHRC has
declared that application of the WLAD should be consistent with other
state anti-discrimination laws where they are comparable. 4°
1. The Missouri Prohibition Against Personal Liability Supports
Consistent WLAD Interpretation
The WHRC mandate of consistency with other state laws, coupled
with the holding that Missouri law enjoins personal liability,' support
the conclusion that individuals should not be liable as employers under
the WLAD. Using language nearly identical to the WLAD, the Missouri
Human Rights Act (MHRA) defines "employer" to include "any person
employing six or more persons, within the state, and any person directly
acting in the interest of an employer."' 42 Like the WLAD, the MHRA
makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex."
143
Although Missouri state courts have not addressed personal liability
under the MHRA, federal courts sitting in Missouri have interpreted the
MHRA as barring individuals from liability as employers. 44 In Lenhardt
v. Basic Institute of Technology, a former employee brought an MHRA
disability claim against his employer and the employer's president who
was also the company's sole director and sole shareholder. 45 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit noted that it could see no reason why the Missouri
Supreme Court would not take analogous federal employment
discrimination law into account if faced with the issue of personal
liability under the MHRA. 46 Plaintiff Lenhardt argued that the Title VII
Gatewood Prod., Inc., 484 S.E.2d 481, 489 (W. Va. 1997) (finding individuals may be liable because
statute imposes liability upon "any person, employer, employment agency"); see supra note 6.
140. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(3)(c) (1997).
141. Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995).
142. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 213.010(6) (West 1996).
143. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 213.055(l)(a) (West 1996). The MHRA also contains a provision declaring
it unlawful to aid, abet, compel, or coerce the commission of acts prohibited under the chapter. Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 213.070 (West 1996).
144. Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 381; Lyles v. Principal Health Care, Inc., No. 4:96CV2075, 1997 WL
669963, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 22, 1997); Stevenson v. Brod Dugan Paint & Wall Coverings, 934
F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
145. 55 F.3d at 377-78.
146. Id. at 380.
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and MHRA definitions of "employer" were not analogous because under
Missouri law, an individual need not be an agent to fit the definition of
"employer."' 47 The court rejected this argument, calling it "a distinction
without a difference," and explaining, "If the words 'any agent of such a
person' and 'any person directly acting in the interest of an employer'
subjected corporate supervisory personnel to individual liability, [the
defendant] would come within either definition of an employer."' 48 In
other words, because the definitions of "employer" are essentially the
same, if the individual defendant were liable under one statute, he would
have to be liable under the other statute as well. The court concluded,
however, that every federal circuit that had ruled on the issue of personal
liability had held that individuals could not be liable under the Title VII
definition of "employer."' 49 Therefore, the individual defendant in this
case could not be liable as an employer under the MHRA.'°
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the MHRA in Lenhardt provides two
compelling arguments against liability for individuals as employers
under the WLAD. First, Lenhardt interprets language nearly identical to
the WLAD definition of "employer" and finds no basis for personal
liability. Second, Lenhardt illustrates that the Title VII "any agent"
language and the MHRA and WLAD "person acting in the interest'
language are sufficiently similar to warrant an interpretation of the WLAD
consistent with the Title VII prohibition against personal liability.
2. The Tennessee Bar on Personal Liability Confirms Correctness of
Precluding Personal Liability Under the WLAD
The interpretation of Tennessee law as barring personal liability also
demonstrates that individuals should not be liable as employers under the
WLAD. In Carr v. United Parcel Service, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee interpreted the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), which
is analogous to the WLAD in several respects, as protecting individuals





151. 955 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1997); see also Steele v. Superior Home Health Care, No. 03A01-
9709-CH-00395, 1998 WL 783348, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1998) (relying on Carr finding
of no individual liability); Hubrig v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., No. 03A01-9711-CV-
00525, 1998 WL 240128, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 1998) (same).
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"persons employing eight (8) or more persons within the state, or any
person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly."'' 12 The
THRA also forbids discrimination in the terms or conditions of
employment because of one's sex.'53 The Carr court examined the
THRA in the context of a sexual harassment claim against both the
employer and co-employees, and held that the "agent of an employer"
language does not impose personal liability.5 4 The court found more
compelling the argument that the agent language imposed vicarious, as
opposed to personal, liability for three reasons. First, the court stated that
vicarious liability was more consistent with the THRA small business
exemption.'55 Second, the court found that agents are generally not
individually liable for acts taken on behalf of a principal.'56 Third, the
court noted that personal liability was not consistent with the federal
courts' interpretation of Title VII. 57 The similarity between the WLAD
and the THRA definitions of "employer," coupled with the Supreme
Court of Tennessee's reasons for holding individuals not liable under the
THRA, support interpreting the WLAD as barring personal liability.
3. Analogous Florida Law Precludes Personal Liability, Supporting
WLAD Prohibition Against Personal Liability
Individuals should not be liable under the WLAD because they are not
liable under the analogous Florida law and because the WHRC
regulations require consistency with analogous laws from other states.
Federal courts sitting in Florida have examined the Florida Civil Rights
Act (FCRA) and held that it does not allow for personal liability for
sexual harassment. 5 8 Identical to Title VII, the FCRA defines
152. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-102(4) (1998).
153. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-401(1) (1998).
154. 955 S.W.2d at 835.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The court also held that the statutory language barring "persons" from aiding and abetting
violations of the act could result in personal liability. Id. at 836 (referring to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 4-21-301(2)); see Steele v. Superior Home Health Care, No. 03A01-9709-CH-00395, 1998 WL
783348, at *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1998) (holding individual liable as aider and abettor).
158. King v. Auto, Truck, Indus. Parts & Supply Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1382-83 (N.D. Fla.
1998); Huck v. Mega Nursing Servs., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1462, 1464 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Sanders v.
Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 571, 573-74 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Jolley v. Wallace, 95-147 CIV-
ORL-22, 1995 WL 463709, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 1995); Urquiola v. Linen Supermarket, Inc.,
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"employer" as "any person employing 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."' 59 The FCRA
further states that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to "discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's... sex."'" In Sanders v. Mayor's Jewelers, an employee
brought Title VII and FCRA sexual harassment claims against her
employer and supervisors. 6' The Sanders court agreed with the
defendants that because the FCRA is closely modeled after Title VII,
Florida courts should apply federal case law interpreting Title VII to
decide issues under the FCRA 62 By analogy to the Title VII holdings
regarding personal liability, the Sanders court held that individuals
should be exempt from liability for sexual harassment under the FCRA 63
The plaintiff in Sanders sought to distinguish the FCRA from Title
VII by arguing that there were sufficient differences between the laws so
as to warrant an independent examination of the state statute.'6 Although
the Sanders opinion does not elaborate, it appears that the plaintiff cited
the liberal construction provision of the FCRA as support for her claim
that the FCRA casts a wider liability net than Title VII and thus includes
personal liability under the state law. 65 The court explicitly rejected this
argument and concluded that there was "no reason why this Court should
construe identical statutory provisions to produce meanings differing
widely enough to submit a whole new class of defendant to suit in
discrimination actions brought under the FCRA. ' 166 The Sanders case is
an additional example of a court interpreting a state statute analogous to
the WLAD to bar individuals from liability as employers. 67 Therefore,
No. 94-14-CIV-ORL-19, 1995 WL 266582, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 1995). Florida state courts
have not addressed personal liability under the FCRA.
159. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02(7) (West 1997).
160. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.10(1)(a) (West 1997).
161. 942 F. Supp. 571.
162. Id. at 573.
163. Idat 574.
164. Id at 573-74.
165. Id. at 573. The FCRA requires that the statute "be liberally construed to further the general
purposes" of the chapter. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.01(3) (West 1997).
166. Sanders, 942 F. Supp. at 574.
167. Sanders is also valuable because it provides an example of a response to the argument that
the liberal construction provision of the WLAD mandates personal liability.
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individuals should be protected from liability as employers under
Washington law.
4. Other State Sexual Harassment Statutes Bar Individuals from
Liability as Employers
Courts in many states have not independently examined their state
sexual harassment laws regarding the specific question of personal
liability, but have followed the federal interpretation of Title VII and
barred personal liability.168 These cases interpreting analogous state laws,
coupled with the WHRC regulations encouraging interpretation and
application of the WLAD consistent with analogous federal and state
anti-discrimination laws, further illustrate that Washington courts should
interpret the WLAD to bar personal liability in sexual harassment cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the past thirty years, personal liability for sexual harassment under
Title VII has been vigorously litigated in federal courtrooms across the
country. In the absence of Washington case law or scholarly commentary
on the issue, the federal courts' reasons for consistently denying personal
liability under Title VII are invaluable when examining personal liability
in Washington.'69 Analysis of the statutory structure of the WLAD, its
legislative history, and public policy, in conjunction with the
interpretation of Title VII and other states' sexual harassment laws,
demonstrates that individuals should not be personally liable as
employers under the WLAD. Individuals should remain exempt from
personal liability for sexual harassment unless and until the American
political conscience motivates a change in the law.
168. Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying Kentucky
law); Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania law); Taylor v.
Scottpolar Corp., 995 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D. Ariz. 1998) (applying Arizona law); Gates v. City of
Dallas, No. CIV.A. 3:96-CV-2198-D, 1997 WL 405144, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (applying Texas
law).
169. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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